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Abstract
In economic perspective, the agency relationship between a patient
and his physician has dramatically changed in the past years and is still
evolving. Great emphasis is now placed on communication issues. The
debate on the amount and precision of information on his health status
the patient would/should acquire is still open and likewise the definition
of the role of the patient’s choice in the agency relationship. The debate
is not only academic: in fact, it has important policy implications on the
reimbursement schemes for physicians and informed consent.
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1 Introduction
The theory that studies patient behaviour and the agency relationship with the
patient’s physician has undergone several important changes over time.
Firstly, the literature on Health Economics has moved from the old perspec-
tive, where the patient was passively accepting doctors’ advice and treatment,
to an approach characterised by strategic interaction between patient and physi-
cian. In the agency relationship the physician’s informational advantage makes
him able to influence the medical services used by the patient. However, while
in the standard agency the physician’s activity is (at least partially) charac-
terised by opportunistic behaviours motivated by financial self-interest, in the
new perspective the physician is benevolent but cannot commit either to not
revealing the truth or to reporting information truthfully to his patient. As will
be discussed, this leads to credibility problems. The crucial ingredient of the
latter approach is that the patient experiences anticipatory feelings and his fears
and hopes are of central concern to health professionals. As a consequence, in
the following, we will call it emotional agency1.
This evolution over time has interesting features and suggests important
policy considerations. As will be discussed, two relevant issues are the patient’s
information on his health condition and the degree of the physician’s altruism.
The emotional agency approach is motivated by a growing literature on be-
havioural medicine (see for example the Cambridge Handbook edited by Baum
et al. 1997), showing that one of the consequences of stress and anxiety associ-
ated with medical procedures or uncertain health outcomes is that patients often
exhibit choices of health information that may seem anomalous. For example,
since information can raise anxiety, the patient may prefer not to be informed
about health matters. Translated into economic language, a consequence of the
patient’s fears of bad news about his health conditions is that he may ‘ratio-
nally’ postpone the resolution of uncertainty (deciding to stay ignorant) even
though such uncertainty implies taking less eﬃcient actions (see Koszegi 2003).
The aim of this survey is to discuss the role of health information in the
diﬀerent approaches used to analyse patient-physician strategic interaction. In
particular, while in the standard agency literature information is beneficial since
it can be used by the patient to mitigate the physician’s opportunistic behaviour,
in the emerging view physicians are completely benevolent and information is
detrimental to anxious patients. In this respect and considering patients’ em-
powerment, while the central role of the patient in the agency relationship is
not doubted, both the strategic choice of the patient as regards the level of
information learning on his health status and the transmission of information
from the physician to the patient are open issues.
Taking into account anxiety and anticipatory feelings adds an important
new element to the patient-physician relationship and leads to some important
policy implications as regards the design of contracts for providing health care,
and the nature and contents of informed consent.
1This is the title of a recent paper by Botond Koszegi (see Koszegi 2005).
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2 Standard physician agency
The old view
The literature studying the demand for health care had initially assumed
that the patient played no role in the decision on the type and the amount of
health care to be consumed. At the very beginning, the patient was considered
an ‘irrational’ economic agent since he was not able to translate his perceived
need for health improvement into a demand for health care, even when cor-
rectly informed. Thus, any decision regarding patient health was delegated to
the physician and the patient-doctor relationship was characterised by paternal-
ism (and, more generally, government paternalism represented one of the most
important motivations for public provision of health care, see Musgrave 1959).
Subsequently, in what we call the old view of the agency relationship, the
physician, being a perfect agent for the patient, chooses exactly the decisions
the patient would have taken had he had the same level of information (Feld-
stein 1970, Phelps 1992). Here, delegation to the physician is indeed optimal
and eﬃcient since the latter is completely benevolent, perfectly informed about
health matters and takes decisions for the patient only in his best interest. The
patient has no reason to search for information, his best option is to go and see
his physician and follow the prescribed treatment.
This view was justified on several grounds: in the case of paternalism the
patient could not be involved in treatment choice given his inability to process
health information and medical matters. In the case of perfect agency, medical
ethics make doctors prescribe only appropriate treatments (Shackley and Ryan
1994). What is relevant in the perspective that we adopt here is that, in both
situations, patient information is completely useless.
Standard agency
The old view shows a number of drawbacks, the most important being
that it does not take into account the physician’s market power. In particu-
lar, the physician has important informational advantages making opportunis-
tic behaviours possible. His superior knowledge concerns the patient’s medical
conditions, the available treatments and their possible eﬀects. Moreover, the
physician’s actions are often not observable by the patient and quality of ser-
vices received is sometimes not verifiable, even ex-post. Whenever his objective
function is not perfectly aligned with that of the patient, the physician can use
his informational advantage to provide low eﬀort in order to decrease his disu-
tility costs (Ma and McGuire 1997), or to provide over-treatment in order to
increase the remuneration of his work (Evans 1974, Farley 1986, Mooney and
Ryan 1993, DeJaegher and Jeger 2000 and 2001, McGuire 2000). The theoreti-
cal and empirical literature has extensively studied the latter problem (usually
defined as ‘demand inducement’) which produces an increase in the price and
volume of health care and, finally, a decrease in the appropriateness of health
care and patients’ satisfaction.
A definite test for the theory of demand inducement has never been formu-
lated; nevertheless health economists have definitely recognised that physicians
are experts with a specific utility function characterised by some level (not ob-
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servable and heterogeneous) of altruism towards patients. In line with standard
results in Incentives Theory (see for example Wolinsky 1993), raising competi-
tion between health professionals has been indicated as a way to increase both
quality of care and physician eﬀort. In Gravelle (1999) and Levaggi and Rochaix
(2003) patients’ choice of GP makes health professionals compete for patients
so that physicians’ market power is reduced. Considering health profession-
als’ reimbursement, a standard result is that fee-for-services encourages over-
treatment provision, while capitation payments and cost-sharing between physi-
cians and health insurers are appropriate measures to promote cost-containment
from the supply side of health systems. In particular, optimal reimbursement
schemes that might avoid demand inducement are analysed in McGuire (2000),
Scott (2000), Levaggi and Rochaix (2003), Bardey and Lesur (2004). In some
papers, both the remuneration system and the access to primary and secondary
care are used to provide physicians with the appropriate incentives (Jelovac
2001, Malcomson 2004, Garcia Marinoso and Jelovac 2003).
What is more relevant for the purpose of our survey is the role of patient’s
health information in the agency relationship. In the last decades people’s atti-
tude towards health information has dramatically changed. This phenomenon
is the result of several factors, probably the most important being that average
health literacy has significantly grown and that people now have easy access to
several sources of health information2. In the eighties a strand of the literature
developed the idea that the patient can obtain health information and use it to
decrease, to some extent, the physician’s informational advantage. Pauly and
Sutterwaithe (1981) empirically analyse the relationship between reputation,
patients’ information and fees charged by the physicians. In Dranove (1988) pa-
tients learn about the physician’s past behaviours and are more likely to refuse
the physician’s recommendation when the physician has the reputation of not
being accurate. In other words, physicians’ attention to reputation positively
aﬀects the price of their services and mitigates the incentives to overprescribe
treatment. Rochaix (1989) provides an interesting example of how patient in-
formation may aﬀect the agency relationship. In her model, before asking for a
physician’s advice, the patient looks for information to reduce the uncertainty
on the appropriate treatment: the patient evaluates the cost and benefits of
searching for information and plays an active role in improving the appropriate
use of medical resources. In fact, when he sees the doctor, the patient does not
reveal his information to him and accepts the diagnosis and the treatment pro-
posed only if the latter is compatible with the information previously obtained.
This obliges the physician to act more in the interest of the patient.3
Calcott (1999) and De Jaegher and Jeger (2001) follow a diﬀerent approach
in investigating supply-induced demand. Both models use a cheap talk sig-
2Even if the Internet was still not available in the eighties, the other media were increasingly
aware of health-related matters. People also often relied on the information obtained from
friends and relatives. See the HSC Household Survey (2001) for a description of the evolution
in the use of sources of health information alternative to health professionals.
3 See Levaggi and Rochaix (2003) for a review of the models which have emphasised the
patient’s role in the consumption of health care.
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nalling game where the physician has incentives to provide the wrong diagnosis
to induce the patient to choose the most expensive treatment. Interestingly,
De Jaegher and Jeger (2001) show that such a model is appropriate to analyse
induced demand when health services take the form of ‘credence goods’: the
patient is unable to observe how treatment contributed to his utility even after
consumption. By interpreting induced demand as a problem of strategic com-
munication transmission, this model makes the link among health economics on
physician behaviour, the signalling literature and the one on expert services.
Other authors have focused on the flow of information from the physician to
the patient and on the role played by the latter in the final decision concerning
treatment options. Gafni et al. (1998) and (1999) suggest that the patient has
to receive from the physician all the information necessary to make appropriate
decisions about his treatment. This provides better results in terms of health
outcome and cost containment (Stewart 1995; Stewart et al. 2000; Britten
2004). A more involved patient, in fact, feels that his physician cares for his
health, complies more easily with prescriptions and increases the probability of
a positive outcome.
However the real interaction between patient and physician appears richer
and more complex than the above- mentioned literature has shown. In particu-
lar, in the strategical interaction between patient and physician, is information
always beneficial to patients? How can the process of patient information learn-
ing be described? Does the communication between physician and patient raise
credibility issues?
3 Emotional agency
The most recent literature focuses on patient attitude to information and on
communication. This new view introduces a crucial element: health informa-
tion is associated with anticipatory and emotional feelings neglected so far. In
particular, the usual conjecture that more information is always preferred to
less might not be valid in this context, at least not for all patients. In par-
ticular, a personal attitude towards health information exists, which depends
on the ability to manage anxiety, i.e. the natural fear of receiving bad news.
As Behavioural Medicine has shown, anxiety can lead to apparently anomalous
behaviours in information gathering: anxious patients may avoid going to see
their doctor or obtaining easily available information about their health. This
can be explained considering that actions are aﬀected by anticipatory feelings
and that choices are often aimed at lowering our level of anxiety.
The Psychological Expected Utility model proposed by Caplin and Leahy
(2001) extends expected utility theory in order to explain how anticipatory feel-
ings influence decision makers4. According to such a framework, the standard
model of choice under uncertainty must be enriched by adding beliefs to the
description of consequences, in order to capture anticipatory feelings such as
4 In particular the authors provide an example from portfolio theory to illustrate the po-
tential impact of anticipation on investment decisions and asset prices.
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anxiety or hopefulness. Utility depends not only on physical utility but also
on the anticipation of such physical utility. Thus, people perceive an emotional
utility which is directly aﬀected by beliefs about future outcomes. Since people
derive utility directly from their beliefs, they must consider how the information
they gather will aﬀect those beliefs. This implies that information choices are
also motivated by anticipatory feelings.
In the case of patients and health information the problem of anxiety re-
lated to future health outcomes is particularly relevant. It has been observed
that attitude towards information is not uniform: some patients prefer to learn
their health conditions, even if this means receiving bad news (early resolvers)
while others, the more anxious, prefer to stay ignorant (late resolvers).5 Kozsegi
(2003) shows that, if the patient is suﬃciently anxious (i.e. information-averse),
the choice of staying ignorant can be optimal even though it implies damage
deriving from ineﬃcient actions. In other words, since information-averse pa-
tients dislike bad news more than they like good news, they might choose to get
a treatment based on their priors about future health rather than one based on
the observation of their true health status.6
Some recent studies7 show that physicians express diﬃculty in revealing sen-
sitive information to their patients. In particular, doctors take their patients’
emotions into account and, more importantly, their recommendations and com-
munication are aﬀected (and even ‘distorted’) in response to them. In this re-
spect, feelings add an important dimension of complexity to the doctor-patient
interaction; two recent papers, Caplin and Leahy (2004) and Kozsegi (2005),
investigate this issue.
Caplin and Leahy (2004) analyse a show-and-tell game where the patient,
who is facing an impending operation, has private information on his type: he
can be either an early or a late resolver patient. When the patient is an early
resolver he is characterised by preference for early resolution of uncertainty
concerning his operation; when he is a late resolver he prefers late resolution
of uncertainty. The patient decides whether to reveal his type to the physician
or not. The physician observes what type of operation the patient needs: the
operation can be characterised either by low or high risk. When the operation
is low risk the preferred outcome α is more likely than the worst one β, whereas
when the operation is high risk the opposite holds. Once the message has been
received by the patient (who can show or not show his type), the physician must
decide whether to tell the patient which operation he needs. The physician is
entirely empathetic, that is he derives utility only from his beliefs in the patient’s
welfare. Both patient and physician can certifiably communicate their private
information.8
5See Roth and Cohen (1986).
6 In the same vein, Barigozzi and Levaggi (2005) show that anxiety can explain the search
for health information on the Internet, a far less informative channel than a visit to a physician
or a medical test. The intuition is that partial information learning allows late resolver patients
to trade-oﬀ the anxiety cost of information with the benefits in terms of more accurate actions.
7 See Ptacek and Eberhardt (1996), Christakis (1999) and the last section in Kozsegi (2004).
8 Since the payoﬀs in the show-and-tell game depend on beliefs about other players’ strate-
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The patient experiences utility in two periods, both occurring after the play
of the show-and-tell game. In the first period, before the operation takes place,
since the patient anticipates the operation, he experiences feelings of anxiety
which depend on the information that he has (possibly) received from the doctor.
The second period corresponds to the operation itself and utility is the same
for the early and the late resolver patient (with U2 (α) ≥ U2 (β) = 0): both
calculate expected utility using posterior beliefs. Assuming that the patient’s
prior concerning the low-risk operation is 1/2, and letting p1 denote the posterior
probability that the patient attaches to the low-risk operation, a late resolver
patient’s whole utility is:
V L (p1) = ap1 − b
µ
p1 −
1
2
¶2
+ p1U2 (α)
while an early resolver patient has preferences:
V E (p1) = ap1 + b
µ
p1 −
1
2
¶2
+ p1U2 (α)
The first two terms in the utility functions describe anticipatory utility. ap1
(a ≥ 0) represents pessimistic beliefs lowering the level of anticipatory utility.
The parameter b reflects the impact of pure uncertainty on anxiety. Note that
the late resolver’s utility is convex whereas the early resolver’s one is concave
in p1. Thus information learning, leading to more precise expectations about
future outcomes (p1 6= 1/2), makes a late resolver patient worse oﬀ, at least
when news is suﬃciently bad.
The physician is perfectly empathetic and observes the true probability of
the operation type. Letting pd be the true probability that the operation is low
risk, when facing a late resolver patient, the doctor’s preferences are:
V Ld (p1|pd) = ap1 − b
µ
p1 −
1
2
¶2
+ pdU2 (α) (1)
Thus, the physician evaluates the patient’s anticipatory utility (the first two
terms in 1) exactly as the patient does, but he evaluates the patient’s expected
physical utility using the true probability pd, while the patient uses beliefs p1.
The physician would act in the patient’s best interest only if he could dis-
criminate among patients. To early resolvers, he would oﬀer the truth about the
operation. To those that are information-averse, he would say nothing. This
ideal solution, however, clashes with the fact that, if the news to be released
to a late resolver is good, keeping this piece of information away from him re-
duces the patient’s utility (this is a consequence of the term ap1 in the utility
functions). The benevolent physician would have to inform the patient in this
case. The patient anticipates that the physician would transmit only good news,
with the result that, when the doctor does not reveal anything, his behaviour
gies, the authors apply the psychological game model of Geanakoplos et al. (1989).
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is interpreted as bad news. This is called the ‘no news is bad news’ eﬀect. To
avoid this credibility problem, the physician will always inform the patient: in
equilibrium the doctor reveals all the information to both patient types.
Caplin and Leahy (2004) present a theory of communication with emotion-
ally relevant certifiable information and no choice of action. Kozsegi (2005)
extends the previous setting to a situation where the patient’s information has
decision-making value: the patient’s choice of treatment is taken into account.
In particular, firstly the doctor privately (and probabilistically) observes a di-
agnosis which aﬀects the optimal treatment. Secondly, the physician sends a
message to the patient, who chooses one of two treatments.9 The physician is
completely benevolent and the patient’s utility depends both on future health
outcomes and anticipatory feeling. The author analyses both the model where
the doctor can certifiably convey the diagnosis to the patient (as in Caplin and
Leahy 2004), and the model where information is not verifiable.10
Patient utility is adapted from Caplin and Leahy (2001, 2004) such that
cheap talk communication is allowed and an action is taken by the patient. In
particular, if we consider again the two possible states of nature α and β and
the posterior belief p1, the first period emotional utility takes the form:
u (p1h (α, t) + (1− p1)h (β, t))
where u (·) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and t is the action
(treatment). As before, when the patient is a late resolver u (·) is concave in p1
and, given a certain action t, the patient prefers to stay ignorant. The opposite
holds when the patient is an early resolver. When u (·) is linear, the patient
is neutral with respect to information. The function h(·, ·) represents second
period utility which is aﬀected both by the state of nature realised in the first
period and by the action t taken in the first period as well. Note that here
a = 0.
When the physician cannot certifiably communicate the diagnosis s = α, β,
the author shows that essentially the only way to transmit information is through
treatment recommendations.11 Moreover, to make the patient feel better, the
physician will distort treatment recommendation towards the treatment that is
optimal when the diagnosis is good. Since the patient anticipates the doctor’s in-
centives to provide optimistic information through wrong treatment recommen-
dation, indeed he feels worse. In fact, wrong treatment choice makes expected
outcome decrease, and the anticipation of such future low health outcomes in-
creases the patient’s anxiety. As Koszegi (2004, page 3) observes: ‘Fears have
a self-defeating aspect’. Moreover, the greater the importance of emotions in
9The model also allows consideration of the case in which the treatment choice is directly
taken by the doctor.
10The author uses a diﬀerent solution concept from Caplin and Leahy’s (2004): the concept
of ‘emotional perfect Bayesian equilibrium’, where the standard notion of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium is appropriately modified for games with emotions.
11 In this specific case the model presents some similarities with De Jaegher and Jeger (2001).
In fact, in both papers the communication game between the physician and his patient is
analysed as a cheap talk model.
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the patient’s utility, the less useful (because more distorted) the doctor’s recom-
mendations are and, therefore, the lower the average physical and anticipatory
utility. Thus, the model shows that because of emotions, the doctor and the
patient are not able to reach the common objective of maximising the patient’s
expected utility.
In the model where the doctor can certifiably reveal the diagnosis and with-
out considering treatment options, the author generalises the full disclosure
result of Caplin and Leahy (2004): if the probability of observing a diagnosis is
less than one, the physician communicates to the patient only good news and
pretends not to have the diagnosis when news is bad. When the patient asks
another doctor for a second opinion, the second physician discloses more bad
news than the first one. This happens because the patient interprets two ‘no
diagnosis’ communications more negatively than just the first one. As a result,
the patient learns bad diagnosis more slowly (only after two medical opinions)
than good diagnosis. Moreover, as regards patients with heterogeneous atti-
tudes towards information, results show that, with two doctors, late resolver
patients receive more information from the first physician than early resolver
ones. Introducing the diagnosis in the model with certifiable information, the
author shows that a possible equilibrium is the following: the doctor discloses
good news and very bad news but not the news in between. The intuition is
that, when the diagnosis is very bad, the physician must tell the patient the
truth to prevent him from choosing too inaccurate treatment.
To summarise, both models show that, when the patient is characterised
by anticipatory feelings and the physician maximizes patient utility, the latter
is not able to disclose information in the patient’s best interest. The patient
anticipates that the physician cares about both his emotions and his physical
health, moreover he knows that the doctor is ready to hide (or even distort)
information to make him feel better. Thus, credibility problems arise. This is
an important conclusion contrasting with the previous literature where patient
welfare always improved if the physician was acting in the patient’s interest.
In the models with certifiable information the ‘no news is bad news’ result
derives from the physician’s inability to commit to the ex ante optimal strat-
egy, i.e. not to provide information to the late resolver type, even when such
information is represented by good news. However, as Caplin and Leahy (2004,
page 501) observe, the commitment problem could be solved only if the pro-
vision of information were left to an eﬀectively neutral ‘mechanism designer’:
“information [must be] kept out of the hands of empathic caregivers”. In the
same vein, when information is not certifiable, welfare could increase “by de-
creasing or eliminating the agent’s discretion in choosing her recommendation
or action” (Kozsegi 2005, page 20). However, even if some professional norms
and guidelines could have a partial commitment role, they are unable to control
for all the diﬀerent situations that may characterise the communication stage.
As Kozsegi (2004) shows, in the case of non-verifiable information, the com-
munication problem between the physician and his patient can be mitigated if
the patient does not know the general properties of his medical conditions. In
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fact, if the patient is ‘not educated’, he is not able to infer a diagnosis from the
doctor’s recommendation and his anticipatory feelings are not aﬀected by the
treatment proposed by the doctor. However, when health education improves
the patient’s ability to diagnose himself, the distortion in patient’s recommen-
dation decreases as well as the communication problems because the patient’s
priors are less dispersed. A final interesting observation is that, since early
information alleviates later communication problems, disclosure of partial in-
formation seems beneficial.12
4 Policy implications
According to the standard view, the patient wants to be informed about his
health status and treated if ill. The physician should deliver information and
treatment using the most cost-eﬀective techniques. The right system of remu-
neration for health professionals is the one which assures that the physician
is provided with good incentives to make a diagnosis and to recommend the
appropriate treatment at the lowest cost. In particular, concerning diagnosis
provision, only strictly necessary checks and medical tests should be prescribed.
As was mentioned in section 2, the level of eﬃciency in health provision might
improve by increasing patient health information from sources other than his
physician and by raising competition among health professionals such that pa-
tients choose their doctor taking into account his reputation. Thus, health care
systems should allow patients to choose the physician and the treatment that
best fit the patient’s preferences. In turn patients’ choice is meaningful only
if patients are suﬃciently informed both about physicians’ quality and medical
issues.
The new perspective based on the Psychological Expected Utility model adds
a new dimension to this picture, namely anxiety about future health status and
fear of bad news. When the patient approaches a physician, because of the emo-
tional component of his utility, he wants to be reassured about future health
and, when news is bad, he needs time and assistance to cope with his disease:
the timing of information disclosure seems particularly important. Only after
this emotional process has been completed is the patient ready to be treated.
This suggests that physicians provide two extremely diﬀerent medical services:
advice (i.e. the communication of a diagnosis) and treatment. As far as the pro-
vision of the diagnosis is concerned, more time than what is strictly necessary
to transmit information might be needed to enable the patient to cope with his
health problems. Moreover, in this specific phase, defining demand inducement
is quite diﬃcult: the patient might emotionally benefit from a medical test that,
from a strictly medical point of view, is not necessary. Since the patient’s emo-
tions aﬀect his physical health, the policy-maker should not exclusively reason in
budgetary terms when designing the optimal payment scheme for physicians, at
12This is in the spirit of Caplin and Eliaz (2003) who argue that the spread of AIDS could
be reduced by reducing the anxiety associated with testing for the disease. Thus, the authors
suggest making the positive result of the test less informative.
10
least where advice provision is concerned. In other words, in the ‘advice stage’,
when deciding the optimal amount of medical checks and tests, emotional ben-
efits should be considered together with the standard physical benefits of care.
Thus, an appropriate remuneration scheme should induce the doctor to make
the highest eﬀort in communication during the diagnosis provision (this implies
that a second consultation, when ‘emotionally’ useful, should be encouraged).13
Finally, we saw that the role of the patient’s own information and health
education is crucial in patient-physician communication. Patient health infor-
mation is certainly beneficial if obtained before the communication stage (when
anxiety is still not an issue) and if it is accurate. This implies that the policy-
maker should increase his eﬀort in information campaigns about health matters
and that people should be guided in choosing the right high quality sources of
information from the huge amount available on the Internet and in the other
media.
The new developments in physician agency based on Psychological Expected
Utility also enrich the debate onÿ informed consent, both for treatment and for
randomised clinical trials. Informed consent means a patient’s written consent
to a surgical or medical procedure or other course of treatment, given after the
physician has told the patient all of the potential benefits, risks and alternatives
involved.
The traditional view is that the patient should be fully informed about the
treatment oﬀered, the alternatives and whether he is part of a randomised clin-
ical trial (Doyal and Tobias 2001). The need for informed consent has even cast
doubts on whether the results of clinical trials where the consent of the patient
was not obtained should have been published (see the British Medical Journal
of March 1998, entirely devoted to informed consent). The literature has long
debated over whether special populations, such as children and the mentally ill,
can really be considered to have given informed consent. The new developments
in patient attitude towards health information add a new line of debate to this
crucial matter. When dealing with an anxious patient, is the role of a benevo-
lent physician to inform him completely or to pass on only the information that
is relevant to make him comply with the therapy?
This is an open question to which there does not seem to be an easy answer,
also because in many countries doctors are explicitly required to tell the truth:
the legal duty of a doctor is to give information about medical interventions
and especially about material risks. From a legal perspective, informed consent
was defined as requiring information that a reasonable patient would want. The
physician has to choose his best action by balancing several conflicting needs:
encouraging the patient, disclosing information on his real condition and, last
13Notice that one country’s cultural background surely aﬀects the way patients’ emotions
are internalized by physicians. This could explain a part of the great variance in diagnostic
tests and treatment prescriptions by physicians in the South and in the North of Europe.
Physicians in Mediterranean countries provide, on average, more treatment for illness episode
than their colleagues in the North of Europe. When it cannot be explained by diﬀerences
in monetary incentives for physicians or remuneration schemes, such a behaviour could be
motivated by heterogeneity in doctors’ attention to patients’ anxiety.
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but not least, avoiding future legal actions by unsatisfied patients. Unfortu-
nately, in the end, the doctor’s best choice might be to reveal to the patients all
the available information for legal rather than medical reasons. Even if the prac-
tice of ‘defensive medicine’ has been widely analysed, it would be interesting to
investigate its precise role in information disclosure to patients.14 An interest-
ing empirical result is weak evidence that liability practice induces physicians to
spend more time per patient visit. This could imply that liability leads physi-
cians to put more eﬀort into communicating with patients (see Danzon 2000
and references contained). Thus, even if the practice of defensive medicine is
not in the best interest of patients15 , it could positively aﬀect anxious patients
in the communication stage with their physician.
5 Conclusions
The role of the patient in building health care demand has always been a very
controversial point in the health economics literature. This results from the need
to reconcile diﬀerent aspects related to the patient’s information on his health
conditions and on treatment options. Health information makes the patient
aware of his conditions and allows him to mitigate the physician’s opportunistic
behaviours. However, when the patient fears bad health outcomes, information
produces anxiety and must be provided carefully. As the new literature based
on emotional agency shows, strategic interaction between patient and physician
makes communication diﬃcult. Even a completely benevolent physician is not
able to reveal information in a way which is not detrimental to ‘late resolver’
patients. Possible undesirable outcomes are too much information disclosure
and the provision of inaccurate treatments. Health education can alleviate the
communications problems, provided it is provided before the illness episode; in
fact, when patient’s priors about his health condition are less dispersed, the
physician has less incentives to reassure patients through treatment recommen-
dations that are not completely appropriate.
The next step in investigating communication issues in physician agency
could be to reintroduce in the framework some personal interests of the doctor.
Liability and the physician’s financial interests would certainly make the setting
more realistic. We expect a non-benevolent physician to be able to strategically
use the patient’s fears and anxiety to influence the patient’s consumption of care
even further.
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